



Making the science of the social 
 
The 19th century was a century represented by its actors as one of irreversible progress – 
one that the advance of the sciences was driving towards an increasingly developed 
future. In this future, it was thought, knowledge would allow man to emancipate himself 
once and for all; he would be freed from the heaviest and most punishing tasks, which 
would be carried out by machines and other new technologies. The control of fossil fuels 
allowed for the invention of the train, and electricity appeared, as did photography and 
the telegraph. Medicine progressed. Scientific research permitted an increasing number 
of illnesses to be cured and treated through, for example, the first vaccines, which were 
enabled by Pasteur’s discoveries. Amid this effervescence, science found itself placed at 
the centre of all scholarly thought, ripe for theorisation. The advances of chemistry, 
physics and biology fascinated those who Honneth has rightly called philosophers of the 
social (1994). And at the time, more than one of these philosophers envisaged the 
application of natural science’s methods to the study of human societies. 
 
The idea that it is possible to identify the principal natural laws that govern the 
development of human groups – just like it is possible to identify the laws that govern the 
physical world (in order to control it) – gained ground. Saint-Simon (1760-1825), 
envisaged a social physiology whose task would be to observe social phenomena as we 
observe natural phenomena. But it was Auguste Comte (1798-1857) who, theorising what 
we still understand today as sociology, would endorse the particular stand of social 
philosophy that constituted positivism. 
 
In his first texts, the Cours de philosophie positive (written between 1832 and 1842), 
Comte defines positivism as a theory of scientific knowledge whose objective approach 
should eventually give us mastery over social problems, just as the natural sciences allow 
us to improve our mastery over nature. He hypothesises that society has evolved since 
the dawn of humanity in three stages. In the first stage (which he calls theological or 
fictitious), humans explain the world through Gods and other supernatural beings whose 
true nature is beyond their grasp. In the second stage (which he calls metaphysical or 
abstract), that of the Renaissance which led to the Enlightenment, humans make appeal 
to their own abstractions and seek to explain the world through reason. Finally, in a third 
stage (which he calls positive or scientific), they set out to explain the world through 
observation, deduction and experimentation. The example of medicine best illustrates 
this “evolution”. In the positive age, it is no longer a matter of hoping to treat the suffering 
patient through prayer (theological age), nor through bloodletting since rational thinking 
postulates that, if there is suffering, this must be due to bad humours polluting the 
patient’s blood (metaphysical age). Rather, it is a matter of observing, of experimenting, 
and of deducing general laws. It was by following this approach that Pasteur could 
conclude that some illnesses were always microbial in origin. 
 
For Comte, the humans sciences in general (and sociology in particular) are the last 
sciences to arrive in the positive age. The natural sciences have already succeeded in 
establishing that natural phenomena – from a falling stone to the movement of the planets 
– obey a necessary order. In studying the world of nature, they have managed to subdue 
what was formerly explained by a supernatural order. It is time the same was done for the 
social world, because this too – like the whole cosmos – is governed by specific laws, 
Supprimé: , the first of these philosophers
  
even if it presents a greater degree of complexity. We must thus also report social 
phenomena only after having observed them as neutrally as possible (like the astronomer 
observes the movement of the planets) by laying aside all kinds of moral, political and 
religious values. Then we should establish the stable relations that exist between them at 
a given time. Naturally, sociological laws, while relatively stable, vary much more than the 
laws of chemistry, biology or physics. But they can be considered true as tendencies 
whenever observations that have been correctly reproduced in diverse circumstances 
report the same thing. Thus, for example, Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron 
would later show – in their well-known books La Reproduction (1970) and Les Héritiers 
(1985) – that we can correlate social precarity and educational failure. Of course, children 
from the poorest backgrounds can succeed if they manage to integrate and reproduce 
the educational codes produced by (and for) the more affluent classes. But as a general 
rule we observe that their chances are lower. Not because they have a lower IQ, but 
rather because their immediate social and familial environment does not instil in them ad-
hoc social dispositions (language, posture, etc.). 
 
 
A democratic progressivism 
 
As Patrick Baert (1998) and Pierre-Jean Simon (1991) point out, positivism these days 
plays the role of a foil, and it is very often shouted down and used by sociologists to 
disqualify cursorily the theories of their intellectual adversaries. But in the 19th century it 
had a progressive dimension that we tend no longer to see.  
 
The 19th century is an era with a great appetite for democracy. The French Revolution 
has profoundly disrupted thinking about the organisation of societies. Rousseau a few 
decades beforehand, and Tocqueville a few decades afterwards (when France 
experiences a period of royal power’s Restoration that he considers retrograde and 
feudal) have both called for forms of governance that respect the interest of the majority. 
Democratic institutions will allow the general will to prevail over mere individual interests, 
Rousseau postulates. And, Tocqueville thinks, human beings in general undeniably have 
the intellectual capacity to give themselves their own laws, without abandoning their 
sovereignty to an aristocratic class jealous of its unjustified privileges. In the first half of 
the 19th century there thus emerges a democratic enthusiasm that assigns political 
subjects a rational capacity to freely judge the best laws capable of governing society. 
 
Comte is delighted that this democratic aspiration and the metaphysics of the 
Enlightenment have ruined the aristocratic and theological social system. But he also 
tempers this enthusiasm. In a move that brings him closer to counter-revolutionary 
authors and conservatives such as Burke, de Maistre and Bonald (who would also 
influence Saint Simon), he asks himself: is it not a bit naïve to believe that with a click of 
one’s fingers one can establish a social-democratic contract so that a conscious will, 
directed by reason, emerges in each “citizen”, sweeping away their traditions in a single 
stroke? Comte’s question shows clearly that, in reality, people continue to be directed by 
customary rules, their cultures and their religious beliefs. 
 
What we must therefore try to describe and understand, according to the counter-
revolutionary authors, are all those social laws that pre-exist individual “citizens” and their 
political rules. This line of argument – whose intention was to legitimate the return of the 
ancien regime through the study of the social – also sought to draw support from the 
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natural sciences through an audacious sleight of hand. After all, Bonald wondered, “what 
would we think of a physician who imagines he creates the laws of nature rather than 
discovering them? Likewise, what should we think of these revolutionaries who have 
allegedly recreated – based on new norms – a society that in fact both pre-existed and 
produced them” (Bonald quoted by Simon, 1991, p.299)? 
 
But Comte recognises that, by rejecting the idea that people can be citizens in a 
democracy who freely and consciously choose the rules according to which the collective 
functions, these authors all end up sinking into political conservatism and the strictest 
religiosity. In reality, Comte notes, they are moving from neutral observation to the 
justification of norms and principles that govern society behind the scenes (a justification 
that Marx will attribute not long afterwards to ideology, whose role is to uphold the social 
order as it is). They conflate judgement of facts and judgement of values, or empirical 
judgment and normative judgement, to use the expressions that will remain so dear to 
sociology and particularly to Max Weber (1919). 
 
It is true, Comte thinks, that man does not create society, it is society that creates man, 
thus prefiguring Durkheimian determinism (1895) But contrary to these authors, who they 
consider retrograde, Comte and the positivists who will more or less take after him are 
decisively progressivist and democratic, following in the tradition of the Enlightenment. 
The young Herbert Spencer in sociology, Hans Kelsen in law, Ernst Mach in physics, 
Henri Poincaré in mathematics, and even the members of the famous Vienna Circle in 
philosophy, all believe – following Comte – that societies can only be reformed through 
the advance of the scientific mindset. And all of them sustain faith in the virtues of 
democracy. Citizens can determine the goals to be achieved by science through rational 
debate. In this respect scientists have a dual role. Beyond having to determine the means 
to attain these goals, it is their job to inform this public debate using their positive 
knowledge of the natural and social worlds. As Bourdieu will remind us (2001), it is by 
helping actors to better master what determines them socially and culturally that the 
sociologist may help expand their liberty and their democratic capacities. 
 
 
Evolutionism, objectivism, scientism and technocratic danger 
 
Throughout the 20th century, positivism will be the object of numerous critiques. There 
will be many, particularly in anthropology (Boas, Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, Mauss, to 
name a few), who will denounce its evolutionism and its latent ethnocentrism. The 
paradigm had allowed colonisation to be justified by placing western science at the peak 
of evolution and so-called “traditional” societies – still naively wrapped up in a retrograde 
theological age – at the bottom of the scale. Critics will recall the craniometric work 
published by Broca in 1861, which aimed to prove the intellectual inferiority of women 
and black people. For their part, the hermeneutical and phenomenological movements in 
sociology and in philosophy (Husserl, Schütz, Winch, etc.) swiftly demonstrated that it is 
impossible to determine objective social laws, since the definition of a social object varies 
with the meaning a given observer attributes to it from a given position. Meanwhile critical 
theory (Adorno, Habermas et. al, 1976) on the one hand and the sociology of sciences on 
the other (for a good synthesis, see Latour 2005) both managed to challenge the very 
artificial scientistic distinction between facts and values in the second half of the 20th 
century. Thus, in the positivist hope of a politics guided by science (which will be 
inherited in particular by Neurath in the Vienna circle), we might suspect there is a 
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prefiguration of the technocratic appetite that still characterises our contemporary 
democracies. Even today, placing big economic questions into public debate is often 
short-circuited by the emergence of experts who are allegedly more capable than 
ordinary citizens of advising elected representatives which direction to take. In this way, 
positivism has exhibited a certain distrust of common sense that the first American 
pragmatists condemned as early as a century ago (James, 1907). 
 
For all that, it is still the belief in the possible improvement of humanity – whether in the 
laboratory or in the public sphere – that continues to motivate most scientists’ work at the 
start of the 21st century. And, as Feyerabend already judiciously concluded in his essay 
on anarchist epistemology, is it not still ultimately by leaving each researcher to believe 
freely in what they seek to bring to humanity that they will really help expand the domain 
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